Government Accountability

OpportunistIC Accountability

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"Opportunistic Accountability: State-Society Bargaining Over Shared Interests" With s. Grossman, & J. Phillips. Comparative Political Studies (2017). [Appendix; Replication material] Washington Post.

Conflicting preferences between the state and society underpin most accountability mechanisms by providing a credible way for society to impose costs on the state. Adapting a classic bargaining framework, we argue that broader conditions can support state–society bargaining. Policies that both the state and society value can also enhance society’s negotiating power, provided society has a relatively lower valuation and is more patient than the state. By threatening to sabotage their own interests but hurt the impatient state even more, citizens can compel the state to deliver broader policy benefits. We illustrate this logic with the case of polio vaccination in northern Nigeria, where entire communities have resisted the vaccine as a strategy to bargain for more desired services. To resolve and preempt noncompliance, the Nigerian government has enhanced service delivery in other areas, demonstrating the opportunity for improved accountability in the presence of shared-interest policies.


The State of the Social Contract

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State of the Fiscal Contract in Lagos' Informal Settlements with N. Wilson. studies in comparative International development (2022).

Governments often have contentious relationships with residents of urban informal settlements. Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instances it would seem that the state has broken the social contract with its most vulnerable citizens. How do citizens respond? We might expect them to reciprocate in kind, by withholding taxes owed to the government. Using a survey of citizens living in informal settlements across Lagos State in Nigeria, we explore what predicts citizens' willingness to comply with government taxation. In this unlikely context for voluntary compliance, we observe that a third of respondents pay taxes and a majority are willing to pay absent enforcement. We find minimal support for standard theories of tax payment — trust in or reciprocity towards the government, or identification with the nation. Instead, we find that willingness to pay taxes is correlated with group membership, believing that community members respect taxpayers, and donating to the community. Our data suggest that local institutions and social relations are associated with citizens' willingness to comply with tax policy.

“Paying for Growth or Goods: Tax morale among property owners in Lagos” with N. Wilson. conditionally accepted.

What motivates property owners to pay taxes in places where state enforcement is weak? Using an online experiment among property owners in Lagos, Nigeria we evaluate the effectiveness of different appeals at increasing respondents’ tax morale, or willingness to pay taxes absent enforcement, and attitudes about government enforcement of tax collection. Respondents were randomly assigned to read either a vignette emphasizing the role of property taxes in contributing to economic growth and increased property values or a vignette highlighting that tax revenues are used for public goods and services benefiting all residents. The growth message made respondents significantly more favorable toward enforcement of tax collection, but there was no difference in willingness to pay between the two treatment conditions.